In Defense of String Theory

In Defense of String Theory

Evaluating the Scientific Validity of the Theory of Everything

What sorts of standards determine the scientific status of a given theory? It is this question that is essential to our discussion of string theory as a valid/justified part of the scientific enterprise (as opposed to a theory of metaphysics, pseudo-science, or perhaps religion). Even a cursory historical analysis of string theory’s development can elicit the sense that there are countless factions that have arisen among astrophysicists in opposition to string theory’s legitimacy. Yet what evaluative standards do these physicists employ when they dismiss string theory as mere conjecture? Some call on the set of criteria laid out in Kuhn’s Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice and some employ Popper’s falsifiability criterion. In this paper, I will address each of the aforementioned works in an attempt to defend the scientific status of string theory, making use of the following structure:

I. I contend that string theory passes Popper’s falsifiability criterion.

II. I posit that string theory contains all the characteristics of a “good” scientific theory according to Thomas Kuhn’s aforementioned work.

Yet before we can properly evaluate string theory as a legitimate science, we must understand what is at stake, and why such an evaluation is necessary. If one were to empirically-evidentiate the accuracy of string theory, he would be able to attain what many refer to as the “Holy Grail” of physics—the ability to ascertain the Theory of Everything. According to physicist John Ellis, who introduced the term into technical literature, such a theory would “putatively explain and link together all known physical phenomena.” The promise of string theory is infinitely-great; it has the potential to quintessentially-explain the essence of all things: the keyboard upon which I am typing, the existence of elementary particles, and the origin of the universe we inhabit. Yet before we can even fathom justifying string theory as an accurate representation of the universe, we must first disprove those who immediately dismiss it as a theory of pseudo-science—a theory not to be taken seriously. At the very least, this paper aims to assign scientific relevance to string theory—a theory with far-too-much potential to wholly dismiss as unscientific.

Before progressing, we must first have an historical understanding of string theory and the development of its principle tenets. According to Michio Kaku, author of Parallel Worlds, the theory was “discovered quite by accident, applied to the wrong problem, relegated to obscurity, and suddenly resurrected as a theory of everything” (187). Unlike most theories where fundamental laws of quantum physics are used to perfect mathematical equations, physicists stumbled upon the mathematical Euler-Beta function—an equation that “seemed to describe the subatomic world” (188). This sub-atomic world was thought to be founded upon vibrating strings rather than upon particle-points, as current quantum theory posits. Each particle was merely a variation of a certain string-vibration, and each was accordingly assigned a “spin-value” of 0, 1, or 2 which explained inter-particle behavior.

However, many physicists take issue with string theory’s more-abstract principles that have developed more recently. The mathematical equations of the theory necessitate the existence of ten or twenty-six dimensions, as opposed to the mere four dimensions we know as length, width, depth, and time; nowhere else can physicists find a theory “that selects its own dimensionality” (192). Additionally, the divergences and anomalies found within the mathematical equations of string theory are answered by the concept of supersymmetry: the idea that all subatomic particles have partners invisible in nature. Finally, leading string theorists posit the existence of membranes—mysterious, eleven-dimensional entities that contain dimensions which fold upon themselves and necessitate the existence of a multiverse (i.e. parallel universes). For these seemingly scientifically-fictitious tenets, string theory has withstood various attacks that have threatened to undermine its potency as a scientific explanation since 1968. I argue that each challenge to string theory’s legitimacy is accompanied by a more innovative and promising counter—a few of which are subsequently explained.

In his Science: Conjectures and Refutations, Karl Popper seeks to draw the distinction between science and pseudo-science by employing the falsifiability criterion, a principle which is summed up by Popper himself: “The criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability” (179). Thus, if we are to establish string theory as legitimate according to Popper, we must prove that its theoretical mathematics can be tested in nature.

Interestingly enough, prominent astrophysicist Dr. Michio Kaku argues that a mechanism for testing string theory can be ascertained by a technology of the near-future. It turns out that ascertaining echoes from the eleventh dimension posited by the mathematics of string theory is not an unrealistic aspiration. If one is to experimentally validate string theory, he must generate empirical data that gives the theory credibility. There are a multitude of hereto-unobserved entities that string theory posits, some of which are listed below:

1. The tiny mass of the elusive neutrino particle

2. The decays of certain sub-atomic particles

3. New long-range forces

4. Dark matter particles

5. Einstein’s unit of gravity—the graviton

It is at this point in time when the skeptic may object, arguing that no technology fathomable to physicists today is capable of crediting the existence of such abstract and purely-theoretical entities. Yet there are a variety of technologies that are close to being able to do just that: “the device that may decisively settle many of these questions is the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), now nearing completion at the famed CERN laboratory” (Kaku, 276). With its ability to accelerate protons at a speed of 99.9999% the speed of light and its ability to collide those protons at energies exceeding 1.1 trillion volts, the LHC will have the ability to re-create a microcosm of the universe as it looked just moments after the Big Bang. More specifically; such a collision will free quarks into hot gluon plasma, allowing us to observe them through complex computer programs. The cosmology of string theory may “gradually become less a theoretical science and more an experimental science, with precise experiments on quark-gluon plasmas done right in the laboratory” (Kaku, 278). And while we may not be able to prove the accuracy of string theory just yet, its ability to be falsified does exist, as evidenced by the technology of the Large Hadron Collider.

Yet falsifying string theory may not be as complex an endeavor as one might think. Pierre Duhem contends that “the physicist who carries out an experiment implicitly recognizes the accuracy of a whole group of theories” (189). Therefore, we need not have to falsify the string theory as a whole as a means of satisfying the falsifiability criterion, but rather it suffices to falsify merely one of the theories it implicitly recognizes. Astrophysicist Joseph Polchinski argues that all string theory models are “Lorentz invariant, unitary, and contain Einstein’s General Relativity as a low energy limit” (Polchinski). Thus, if it is possible to falsify quantum mechanics, Lorentz invariance, or general relativity, it is possible to falsify string theory. Therefore, string theory can be considered to have legitimate scientific status according to the Popperian standard, as the aforementioned theories are considered to be testable and/or falsifiable.

Next, I will employ the criteria mentioned in Thomas Kuhn’s Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice in an attempt to characterize string theory as a legitimate, scientific theory embodying the following characteristics:

1. Accurate: “Consequences deducible from a theory should be in demonstrated agreement with the results of existing experiments.”

2. Consistent: “A theory should be consistent, not only internally or with itself, but also with other currently accepted theories applicable to nature.”

3. Broadness: “A theory’s consequences should extend far beyond the particular observations or laws it was designed to explain.”

4. Simple: “A theory should bring order to phenomena that in its absence would be individually isolated and confused.”

5. Fruitful: “A theory should disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships” (Kuhn, 213).

Accuracy and consistency must be analyzed together in the context of string theory, as each is inextricably linked to the other; consistency is dependent upon agreement with well-established theories and accuracy is dependent upon the experimental data used to confirm those theories. The principle tenets of string theory do concur with the most- accepted scientific theories of the recent past. We already know from Polchinski’s argument that string theory encompasses Einstein’s General Relativity, but according to Dr. Michio Kaku, string theory “can also offer solutions that are astonishingly close to the Standard Model of particle physics” (206). That is to say, the theory predicts the same “motley collection of bizarre subatomic particles” (207). Yet not only does string theory mathematically predict the same particles the Standard Model does, it also foretells the same mass and coupling strength of said particles. Some object that string theory is disconnected from the established principles of physics; Kaku argues that it actually embodies many of physics’ most fundamental theories.

When we employ broadness and fruitfulness as evaluative standards of string theory, we can conclude that it is a “good scientific theory” according to Kuhnian criteria. Rather than merely positing rules that govern a subject’s particular behavior, string theory has the potential to unify sets of principles that span across multiple scientific disciplines. According to Brian Greene, author of The Elegant Universe, the triumph of string theory is “its natural incorporation of quantum mechanics and gravity” (379). The ability of string theory to universally explain quantum mechanics refers to its ability to provide us with an explanation of all behavior on the atomic level (i.e. the behavior of molecules, atoms, electrons, protons, and other sub-atomic particles). The ability of string theory to explain gravity refers to its ability to incorporate quantum laws with Einstein’s General Relativity, which includes gravitation. If string theory can successfully combine quantum mechanics and gravity into a unified theory, its broadness in scope is infinite; it will explain all the physical phenomena of our universe, allowing us to ascertain new phenomena and new scientific relationships yet to be discovered.

Moreover, a unified string theory would be the most simple and elegant theory known to science. Einstein once said that “if a theory did not offer a physical picture that even a child could understand, then it was probably useless” (Einstein qtd. in Kaku, 196). Fortunately, string theory paints an exceedingly “simple physical picture” which underlies its mathematics—“a picture based on music” (Kaku, 196). According to string theory, strings no larger than Planck length (10-33) can vibrate to produce sub-atomic particles. Imagine the strings on a guitar: if we pluck the 3^rd string on the first fret, we may produce a graviton; however, if we pluck the 4^th string on the third fret, we may produce a beta particle. The beauty of string theory lies within its ability to reduce order from chaos in the form of “cosmic music.”

Yet despite its scientific appeal, string theory has produced a vocal faction of skepticism among astrophysicists. These skeptics argue that string theory is riddled with theoretical entities that can never be empirically-validated by experimental data, regardless of the potential for technological advancement. They would have us believe that even the technology of the LHC can only work in theory, as opposed to in reality.

Yet opponents of string theory fail to realize that astrophysicists are only beginning to scratch the surface of string theory’s complex nature. The skeptics fail to realize that most string theorists do not claim that string theory is accurate; rather, they claim that it is scientifically-relevant and may be evidentiated in the future. Kaku reflects on this in Parallel Worlds: “String theory may very well be the theory of everything, but I believe that it is far from finished. The theory has been evolving backwards since 1968, and its final equations have not yet been found” (238). Those who automatically dismiss string theory are engaging in blatant oversight; they would have us believe that the investigation is over, and that string theory as it stands now is representative of “the theory of everything.” Such a notion could not be further from the truth. The mathematics of string theory have not yet been perfected, and even if the LHC can not empirically-produce string theory’s theoretical entities now, the possibility exists in the future as we continue to add to our arsenal of scientific knowledge.

Some physicists are also skeptical of the five self-consistent superstring theories that undermine string theory’s unifying potential. How can astrophysicists claim to have found a unified field theory if there are five of them? But in 1994, Edward Witten mathematically proved that these ten-dimensional superstring theories were merely “approximations of a higher, mysterious, eleven-dimensional theory of unknown origin” (Kaku, 212). Witten proved that the five self-consistent superstring theories were actually mathematically equivalent, and that each represented an approximation of a higher-dimensional theory. Those wary of string theory can no longer claim that it is internally-inconsistent because of the multitude of 10-dimensional superstring theories.

In an interview with the Public Broadcasting Service, Edward Witten proclaimed:

I feel we are so close with string theory that—in my moments of greatest optimism—I imagine that any day, the final form of the theory might drop out of the sky and land in someone’s lap (Witten qtd. in Kaku).

If we are to infer one thing from Witten’s proclamation, it is that the final form of string theory has yet to be ascertained, and a “framework that makes the existence of each individual ingredient of string theory absolutely inevitable” has yet to be found (Greene, 190). However, the potential for scientific progress is infinite if we can somehow manage to discover this mysterious element that has the potential to unify all the tenets of string theory. For this reason primarily, dismissing string theory as a pseudo-science is a dangerous endeavor, as doing so flies in the face of the potential for scientific progress. And as students of philosophy, if our ultimate goal is the acquisition of knowledge, how can we completely disregard a theory that can teach us everything?

Works Cited

Duhem, Pierre. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954.

Greene, Brian. The Elegant Universe. New York: Vintage, 2000.

Kaku, Michio. Parallel Worlds. New York: Doubleday Press, 2005.

Kuhn, Thomas. "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice." The Essential Tension (1977): 320-39.

Polchinski, Joseph. String Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 1965.

On the Unity of Science: Oppenheim & Putnam

Prominent philosophers Oppenheim and Putnam argue that one day, all of science will reduce to ONE fundamental entity that will solely justify and explain the origin of our universe. Moreover, they believe that one day, we will be able to reduce the study of science to ONE entity capable of being described by ONE scientific language. Below is a discussion of the possibility of being able to ascertain the true nature of our world. Keep in mind that physicists today are currently seeking to do just that (i.e. String Theorists).

Oppenheim and Putnam • Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis

Disunity of Science: A Better Alternative?

According to Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, an historical analysis of scientific progress would lend itself to one ultimate conclusion: that through a cumulative and progressive development of a true understanding of science, a systematic unification of all the various scientific disciplines would be realized.

It is all to clear why such a notion would be appealing to scientists across all disciplines. If Oppenheim and Putnam (O&P) are correct in positing the unity of science, it would eventually be possible to ascertain the explanation of all things—that which reduces to the fundamental entity responsible for the existence of the universe. While hypothesizing the unification and connection of all theories is attractive, the student of scientific philosophy must be wary of O&P’s Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis. I contend that the authors fail to understand the gravity of the assumptions upon which their argument is grounded. The question of whether or not these assumptions are true is irrelevant; I argue that O&P (as mere humans with limited perspective) are not capable of assuming without falling prey to damaging counter-arguments.

First, O&P present two senses of the Unity of Science: one which refers to the ideal state of science and one which exists as a pervasive trend within science. The Unity of Science in the former sense entails the unity of language across scientific disciplines and the unity of explanatory principles which “enable one to see a unity in scientific activities that might otherwise appear disconnected or unrelated, and which encourages the construction of a unified body of knowledge” (268). The latter sense refers to a scientific trend towards unitary science. Unity of Science in this sense does not seek to determine whether or not unitary science will ever be achieved, but rather if it is possible “notwithstanding the simultaneous existence of other, even incompatible trends” (268).

Next, O&P address the reductive levels that are fundamental components to his micro-reduction theory, which states:

Given two theories T1 and T2, T2 is said to be reduced to T1 if and only if:

1. The vocabulary of T2 contains terms not in the vocabulary of T1.
2. Observational data explainable by T2 are explainable by T1.
3. T1 is at least as well systemized as T2.

In keeping with the aforementioned theory, O&P conclude that one, unified science is composed of several, divided reductive levels that each deal with a different object, property, or relation while adhering to the aforementioned necessary conditions. They follow in order of least-reduced to most-reduced:

6 Social groups

5 Multicellular living things

4 Cells

3 Molecules

2 Atoms

1 Elementary particles

O&P argue that these levels are both “natural and justifiable from the stand-point of present-day empirical science” as taking a crucial step from one level to the next involves progressing towards an “overall physicalistic reduction” (271). Moreover, such a theory entails the idea: any whole possessing a division into parts on a given level will be deemed as belonging to that level (271). Consequently, “each level includes all higher levels, and the highest level to which a thing belongs will be considered the proper level of that thing” (271). In summation, O&P argue that all of science can be divided into the aforementioned six levels, with each level dependent on the one below it to be scientifically-explained. Finally, O&P assume that elementary particles are the very foundation of all levels; they are objects that fail to be further reduced and therefore serve as the bedrock of the unification of all the sciences.

The Unity of Science posited by O&P fails on the theoretical level. I will advocate the tenets of scientific pluralism and the principles set forth in Ian Hacking’s Disunity of Science in order to substantiate my contention. Scientific pluralism is defined as “the view that some phenomena observed in science require multiple explanations to account for their nature” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Moreover, pluralists argue that the complexity and representational limitations of our universe allow scientists to present an infinite number of explanatory models, some of which are incompatible with each other. The term representational limitation is of massive importance here: as humans, we are subject to the laws which bind the human condition, and thus of what is directly-represented to our senses. This problem is no more apparent than in the nexus between the law of universal gravitation (Newton) and general relativity theory (Einstein). The equations of Newton’s law yielded precise results within the confines of Earth’s gravitational field, yet broke down in space. Only the equations of Einstein’s general relativity theory could yield accurate results on Earth and in space. Despite the mathematical success of Newton’s law (with Earth’s gravitational field as his principal parameter) there were representational limits to his theory that were evidenced hundreds of years later by Einstein. How can we be sure that the equations of Einstein’s theory of relativity will not break down within new representational limits that will be evidenced hundreds of years from now? If we are bound to the limits of our sense-perception, how can we ever claim to ascertain something as fundamental as the building block—the great unifier—of the universe? For these reasons, I argue that O&P are not able to make the assumptions necessary to posit their Unity of Science, regardless of whether or not the assumptions can be assigned a truth-value.

O&P argue that “any micro-reduction constitutes a step in the direction of Unity of Language in science” (269). However, it is theoretically difficult to conceive of a basic simplification of scientific vocabulary. Let us address the study of mathematics in order to prove the Unity of Language as an unattainable goal. Perhaps the closest unifying language available to scientists today is mathematics; differential and integral calculations are essential to the physicist in justifying his theorems, calculus serves as the foundation of chaos theory, and differential geometry was employed by Einstein in developing the theory of general relativity. It would seem that mathematics as a language applies across all disciplines of science, and therefore acts as a scientific unifier. Yet even the glorified language of mathematics fails to establish unity in the sciences, as argued by Ian Hacking in his Disunity of Science. Hacking refers to the language of mathematics as “the motley of mathematics.” Instead of serving as a scientific unifying agent, mathematics proves to be a mere collection (i.e. motley) of unified theories that fade in and out of relevancy. There are many mathematical theorems that have been accepted as unifying agents; the sheer number of these theories is a testament to a scientific pluralism that deems the goals of O&P’s Unity of Science unattainable. Moreover, while O&P employ theories of evolution and economics to justify their theory of micro-reduction, they fail to provide us with evidence that a unified scientific language is possible. Their Unity of Science as a working hypothesis is thus weakened, as they fail to address it in the first sense of their own definition—as the unity of vocabulary.

Yet not only does Unity of Science fail on the theoretical level; there are also logical counter-arguments to the hypothesis. O&P assume that elementary particles provide a scientific explanation upon which all else depends. They cite Bohr’s basic model of the atom as evidence of the aforementioned and argue that in its present mathematical form, Bohr’s atomic theory is “formidable indeed” because it is today “part of everyone’s conceptual apparatus” (278). Yet physicists today are only beginning to scratch the surface of atomic theory—they argue that there may be more to the elementary particle than meets the “eye.” The elementary particles may reduce to up-quarks and down-quarks, and those quarks may reduce to 11-dimensional strings. Thus, it is evident that our study of science is limited to the laws binding our perception. Therefore, I must reject the Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis and embrace a disunity founded upon scientific pluralism.

Works Cited

Hacking, Ian. “The Disunities of the Sciences.” The Disunity of Science. Eds. Galison and Stump. California: Stanford University Press, 1996.

Oppenheim, Paul, and Hilary Putnam. “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II (1958): 3-36.

“Scientific Pluralism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. 19 March 2009. .

On Scientific Realism: Bas Van Fraasen

In "Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism," author Bas Van Fraasen argues that the purpose of science is to provide us with theories that are empirically adequate. He posits this idea of scientific empiricism, rather than positing scientific realism, a concept referring to the idea that science can provide us with a real and accurate account of the world. Below is my paper in critique of such an interpretation of the role of science...

Bas Van Fraassen • Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

Identifying the Metaphysical Nature of Constructive Empiricism & Other Inconsistencies

For centuries, philosophers have claimed that there is no realistic means for humans to directly perceive the physical objects of our world. Pierre Le Morvan, in his “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How To Counter Them,” addresses one of the many anti-realist contentions—that direct realism is false, and that through an explanation of a sort of “long and complex causal series, physical objects or events cannot be immediate or direct objects of perception” (2). Similarly, in his Laws and Symmetry, philosopher Bas Van Fraassen posits an argument explaining physical phenomena (the use of the term phenomena here is telling) without presuming that those phenomena are borne from rules and/or laws which govern their behavior. What, then, is the role of science? If we can neither directly perceive physical objects nor apply rules and/or laws to physical phenomena, how does the scientist justify his efforts to do just that?

In “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism,” Van Fraassen offers the student of philosophy his answer: constructive empiricism. According to Van Fraassen and his constructive empiricist theory, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is empirically adequate” (358). He further explains that a theory is empirically adequate if and only if it “saves the phenomena” (358). It is this concept of “saving the phenomena” that is the focus of this essay. I contend that in offering this alternative to scientific realism, Van Fraassen falls prey to the very metaphysical trap he seeks to avoid. More broadly, his essay fails to address important tensions that manifest themselves through argumentation.

Van Fraassen succeeds at providing the student of philosophy with an easy-enough definition of what he means by empirically-adequate: “A theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in this world is true—exactly if it saves the phenomena.” Furthermore, he goes on to more precisely define an empirically adequate theory as one that has “at least one model that all the actual phenomena fit inside” (358). Inherent in this precise definition is Van Fraassen’s desire to draw the distinction between science as constructive empiricism and science from a realist perspective—a science he determines “aims to give us a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves only the belief that it is true” (357). Van Fraassen’s reader is ultimately able to discern the difference between constructive empiricism and the more general anti-realist position—something the author is extremely skillful in doing.

Yet Van Fraassen conveniently fails to clearly define what he means by saving the phenomena—a definition we are forced to interpret on our own. According to Kant, phenomena can be defined as objects or events as they appear in our experience, as opposed to objects and events as they are in and of themselves. More specifically-relevant in the context of Van Fraassen’s article, the term phenomena can refer to some mind-dependent entity which exists between the human observer and the actual, real object that is only understood by the mind. Presupposing Van Fraassen’s theory, I am able to safely assume that there is some abstract and invisible thing between me and the lamp that sits on the desk upon which I am writing—a thing which allows me to merely perceive the physical characteristics of the lamp using the senses at my disposal; thus, I can only predict the smooth texture of the brass by feeling it and the white of the lampshade by looking at it. Van Fraassen’s definition of saving the phenomena is predicated on the idea that sense-data merely predict appearances, as opposed to genuinely ascertaining the objective essence of things. Only now can we properly understand the role of science in our world according to Van Fraassen; only now can we comprehend that science seeks to provide a model that explains (i.e. saves) the phenomena.

But this concept of saving the phenomena is quite metaphysical in nature, and therein lies the most damaging inconsistency within the concept of constructive empiricism. Metaphysicists investigate the nature of a reality that transcends the principles of any modern science. The concept of saving the phenomena does just that—it presupposes a transcendent entity that is scientifically inexplicable and empirically inadequate. Van Fraassen argues that the scientist can only assign validity to a theory if it is empirically adequate: “To accept a theory is for us to believe that it is empirically adequate—that what the theory says about what is observable by us is true” (362). Yet since empirical adequacy applies only to the observable world, the reader is forced to assume a notion that is inherently empirically inadequate, as these phenomena are unobservable. Thus, we are unable to accept his theory—we can not see the phenomena that are so essential to the premise!

Moreover, the good empiricist generally seeks to avoid the metaphysical world; he believes in the importance of observation and hypotheses, and values the notion that knowledge is derived from experience. Yet Van Fraassen presupposes a concept that oozes metaphysical substance—a substance that wholly contradicts the essence of scientific empiricism. How can a logical philosopher assign validity to Van Fraassen’s conclusion that constructive empiricism is an accurate definition of science if his empirical conclusion is arrived at by use of a metaphysical premise? The very term empiricism in the context of Van Fraassen’s new anti-realist position is counterintuitive.

Moreover, Van Fraassen seems to have trouble developing a coherent argument concerning the purpose of theory and its association with the concept of explanation. He addresses the contentions of John Smart, a proclaimed scientific realist and author of Between Science and Philosophy. Smart argues that cosmic coincidences (i.e. regularities in observable phenomena) must be explained by some deeper structure (364). In seeking to negate Smart’s contention that the lucky accident explanation simply falls short, Van Fraassen concludes that “there is nothing here to motivate the demand for explanation, only a restatement in persuasive terms” (364). That is to say, Van Fraassen posits that theories merely describe brute regularities that do not have a deeper underlying explanation. Such a grandiose conclusion seems a bit contradictory when the reader recalls the author’s discussion of scientific commitment. According to Van Fraassen:

Acceptance involves not only belief, but a certain commitment—a commitment to confront any future phenomena by means of the conceptual resources of the theory. [The acceptance] determines the terms in which we shall seek explanations (359).

Once again, Van Fraassen employs inconsistent argumentation in the development of his contentions. It would seem incompatible to argue that observable regularities do not require explanation while simultaneously positing that a theory (constructive empiricism) involves a commitment to confront future phenomena in order to determine the terms in which one would seek explanation. What is it, then, that constructive empiricism seeks to achieve? Does not Van Fraassen seek to find that one model that all phenomena fit inside? Would not that provide us with an explanation? These questions go unanswered.

Van Fraassen’s definition of science through constructive empiricism is just as valid as any other theory we have for the explanation of scientific thought, despite being rife with glaring contradictions and troublesome inconsistencies. Yet can any anti-realist be faulted for failing to effectively negate scientific realism? In a discussion of this kind, can we really fault any anti-realist for failing to avoid a metaphysical premise? As Pierre Le Morvan’s “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them” shows us, eight highly-touted arguments against realism can and have failed to defeat it. The justification for this regularity is evident in a major tenet of scientific realism: that the entities described by theory exist independent of the mind. This implies a commitment to metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The scientific realists have it easy.

Works Cited

Fraassen, Bas V. “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism.” The Scientific Image: 355-68.

Le Morvan, Pierre. “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them.” American Philosophical Quarterly 41.3: 221-34.

“Scientific Realism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. 12 Feb. 2009 .