Bas Van Fraassen • Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
Identifying the Metaphysical Nature of Constructive Empiricism & Other Inconsistencies
For centuries, philosophers have claimed that there is no realistic means for humans to directly perceive the physical objects of our world. Pierre Le Morvan, in his “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How To Counter Them,” addresses one of the many anti-realist contentions—that direct realism is false, and that through an explanation of a sort of “long and complex causal series, physical objects or events cannot be immediate or direct objects of perception” (2). Similarly, in his Laws and Symmetry, philosopher Bas Van Fraassen posits an argument explaining physical phenomena (the use of the term phenomena here is telling) without presuming that those phenomena are borne from rules and/or laws which govern their behavior. What, then, is the role of science? If we can neither directly perceive physical objects nor apply rules and/or laws to physical phenomena, how does the scientist justify his efforts to do just that?
In “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism,” Van Fraassen offers the student of philosophy his answer: constructive empiricism. According to Van Fraassen and his constructive empiricist theory, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is empirically adequate” (358). He further explains that a theory is empirically adequate if and only if it “saves the phenomena” (358). It is this concept of “saving the phenomena” that is the focus of this essay. I contend that in offering this alternative to scientific realism, Van Fraassen falls prey to the very metaphysical trap he seeks to avoid. More broadly, his essay fails to address important tensions that manifest themselves through argumentation.
Van Fraassen succeeds at providing the student of philosophy with an easy-enough definition of what he means by empirically-adequate: “A theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in this world is true—exactly if it saves the phenomena.” Furthermore, he goes on to more precisely define an empirically adequate theory as one that has “at least one model that all the actual phenomena fit inside” (358). Inherent in this precise definition is Van Fraassen’s desire to draw the distinction between science as constructive empiricism and science from a realist perspective—a science he determines “aims to give us a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves only the belief that it is true” (357). Van Fraassen’s reader is ultimately able to discern the difference between constructive empiricism and the more general anti-realist position—something the author is extremely skillful in doing.
Yet Van Fraassen conveniently fails to clearly define what he means by saving the phenomena—a definition we are forced to interpret on our own. According to Kant, phenomena can be defined as objects or events as they appear in our experience, as opposed to objects and events as they are in and of themselves. More specifically-relevant in the context of Van Fraassen’s article, the term phenomena can refer to some mind-dependent entity which exists between the human observer and the actual, real object that is only understood by the mind. Presupposing Van Fraassen’s theory, I am able to safely assume that there is some abstract and invisible thing between me and the lamp that sits on the desk upon which I am writing—a thing which allows me to merely perceive the physical characteristics of the lamp using the senses at my disposal; thus, I can only predict the smooth texture of the brass by feeling it and the white of the lampshade by looking at it. Van Fraassen’s definition of saving the phenomena is predicated on the idea that sense-data merely predict appearances, as opposed to genuinely ascertaining the objective essence of things. Only now can we properly understand the role of science in our world according to Van Fraassen; only now can we comprehend that science seeks to provide a model that explains (i.e. saves) the phenomena.
But this concept of saving the phenomena is quite metaphysical in nature, and therein lies the most damaging inconsistency within the concept of constructive empiricism. Metaphysicists investigate the nature of a reality that transcends the principles of any modern science. The concept of saving the phenomena does just that—it presupposes a transcendent entity that is scientifically inexplicable and empirically inadequate. Van Fraassen argues that the scientist can only assign validity to a theory if it is empirically adequate: “To accept a theory is for us to believe that it is empirically adequate—that what the theory says about what is observable by us is true” (362). Yet since empirical adequacy applies only to the observable world, the reader is forced to assume a notion that is inherently empirically inadequate, as these phenomena are unobservable. Thus, we are unable to accept his theory—we can not see the phenomena that are so essential to the premise!
Moreover, the good empiricist generally seeks to avoid the metaphysical world; he believes in the importance of observation and hypotheses, and values the notion that knowledge is derived from experience. Yet Van Fraassen presupposes a concept that oozes metaphysical substance—a substance that wholly contradicts the essence of scientific empiricism. How can a logical philosopher assign validity to Van Fraassen’s conclusion that constructive empiricism is an accurate definition of science if his empirical conclusion is arrived at by use of a metaphysical premise? The very term empiricism in the context of Van Fraassen’s new anti-realist position is counterintuitive.
Moreover, Van Fraassen seems to have trouble developing a coherent argument concerning the purpose of theory and its association with the concept of explanation. He addresses the contentions of John Smart, a proclaimed scientific realist and author of Between Science and Philosophy. Smart argues that cosmic coincidences (i.e. regularities in observable phenomena) must be explained by some deeper structure (364). In seeking to negate Smart’s contention that the lucky accident explanation simply falls short, Van Fraassen concludes that “there is nothing here to motivate the demand for explanation, only a restatement in persuasive terms” (364). That is to say, Van Fraassen posits that theories merely describe brute regularities that do not have a deeper underlying explanation. Such a grandiose conclusion seems a bit contradictory when the reader recalls the author’s discussion of scientific commitment. According to Van Fraassen:
Acceptance involves not only belief, but a certain commitment—a commitment to confront any future phenomena by means of the conceptual resources of the theory. [The acceptance] determines the terms in which we shall seek explanations (359).
Once again, Van Fraassen employs inconsistent argumentation in the development of his contentions. It would seem incompatible to argue that observable regularities do not require explanation while simultaneously positing that a theory (constructive empiricism) involves a commitment to confront future phenomena in order to determine the terms in which one would seek explanation. What is it, then, that constructive empiricism seeks to achieve? Does not Van Fraassen seek to find that one model that all phenomena fit inside? Would not that provide us with an explanation? These questions go unanswered.
Van Fraassen’s definition of science through constructive empiricism is just as valid as any other theory we have for the explanation of scientific thought, despite being rife with glaring contradictions and troublesome inconsistencies. Yet can any anti-realist be faulted for failing to effectively negate scientific realism? In a discussion of this kind, can we really fault any anti-realist for failing to avoid a metaphysical premise? As Pierre Le Morvan’s “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them” shows us, eight highly-touted arguments against realism can and have failed to defeat it. The justification for this regularity is evident in a major tenet of scientific realism: that the entities described by theory exist independent of the mind. This implies a commitment to metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The scientific realists have it easy.
Works Cited
Fraassen, Bas V. “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism.” The Scientific Image: 355-68.
Le Morvan,
“Scientific Realism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. 12 Feb. 2009
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