On the Unity of Science: Oppenheim & Putnam

Prominent philosophers Oppenheim and Putnam argue that one day, all of science will reduce to ONE fundamental entity that will solely justify and explain the origin of our universe. Moreover, they believe that one day, we will be able to reduce the study of science to ONE entity capable of being described by ONE scientific language. Below is a discussion of the possibility of being able to ascertain the true nature of our world. Keep in mind that physicists today are currently seeking to do just that (i.e. String Theorists).

Oppenheim and Putnam • Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis

Disunity of Science: A Better Alternative?

According to Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, an historical analysis of scientific progress would lend itself to one ultimate conclusion: that through a cumulative and progressive development of a true understanding of science, a systematic unification of all the various scientific disciplines would be realized.

It is all to clear why such a notion would be appealing to scientists across all disciplines. If Oppenheim and Putnam (O&P) are correct in positing the unity of science, it would eventually be possible to ascertain the explanation of all things—that which reduces to the fundamental entity responsible for the existence of the universe. While hypothesizing the unification and connection of all theories is attractive, the student of scientific philosophy must be wary of O&P’s Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis. I contend that the authors fail to understand the gravity of the assumptions upon which their argument is grounded. The question of whether or not these assumptions are true is irrelevant; I argue that O&P (as mere humans with limited perspective) are not capable of assuming without falling prey to damaging counter-arguments.

First, O&P present two senses of the Unity of Science: one which refers to the ideal state of science and one which exists as a pervasive trend within science. The Unity of Science in the former sense entails the unity of language across scientific disciplines and the unity of explanatory principles which “enable one to see a unity in scientific activities that might otherwise appear disconnected or unrelated, and which encourages the construction of a unified body of knowledge” (268). The latter sense refers to a scientific trend towards unitary science. Unity of Science in this sense does not seek to determine whether or not unitary science will ever be achieved, but rather if it is possible “notwithstanding the simultaneous existence of other, even incompatible trends” (268).

Next, O&P address the reductive levels that are fundamental components to his micro-reduction theory, which states:

Given two theories T1 and T2, T2 is said to be reduced to T1 if and only if:

1. The vocabulary of T2 contains terms not in the vocabulary of T1.
2. Observational data explainable by T2 are explainable by T1.
3. T1 is at least as well systemized as T2.

In keeping with the aforementioned theory, O&P conclude that one, unified science is composed of several, divided reductive levels that each deal with a different object, property, or relation while adhering to the aforementioned necessary conditions. They follow in order of least-reduced to most-reduced:

6 Social groups

5 Multicellular living things

4 Cells

3 Molecules

2 Atoms

1 Elementary particles

O&P argue that these levels are both “natural and justifiable from the stand-point of present-day empirical science” as taking a crucial step from one level to the next involves progressing towards an “overall physicalistic reduction” (271). Moreover, such a theory entails the idea: any whole possessing a division into parts on a given level will be deemed as belonging to that level (271). Consequently, “each level includes all higher levels, and the highest level to which a thing belongs will be considered the proper level of that thing” (271). In summation, O&P argue that all of science can be divided into the aforementioned six levels, with each level dependent on the one below it to be scientifically-explained. Finally, O&P assume that elementary particles are the very foundation of all levels; they are objects that fail to be further reduced and therefore serve as the bedrock of the unification of all the sciences.

The Unity of Science posited by O&P fails on the theoretical level. I will advocate the tenets of scientific pluralism and the principles set forth in Ian Hacking’s Disunity of Science in order to substantiate my contention. Scientific pluralism is defined as “the view that some phenomena observed in science require multiple explanations to account for their nature” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Moreover, pluralists argue that the complexity and representational limitations of our universe allow scientists to present an infinite number of explanatory models, some of which are incompatible with each other. The term representational limitation is of massive importance here: as humans, we are subject to the laws which bind the human condition, and thus of what is directly-represented to our senses. This problem is no more apparent than in the nexus between the law of universal gravitation (Newton) and general relativity theory (Einstein). The equations of Newton’s law yielded precise results within the confines of Earth’s gravitational field, yet broke down in space. Only the equations of Einstein’s general relativity theory could yield accurate results on Earth and in space. Despite the mathematical success of Newton’s law (with Earth’s gravitational field as his principal parameter) there were representational limits to his theory that were evidenced hundreds of years later by Einstein. How can we be sure that the equations of Einstein’s theory of relativity will not break down within new representational limits that will be evidenced hundreds of years from now? If we are bound to the limits of our sense-perception, how can we ever claim to ascertain something as fundamental as the building block—the great unifier—of the universe? For these reasons, I argue that O&P are not able to make the assumptions necessary to posit their Unity of Science, regardless of whether or not the assumptions can be assigned a truth-value.

O&P argue that “any micro-reduction constitutes a step in the direction of Unity of Language in science” (269). However, it is theoretically difficult to conceive of a basic simplification of scientific vocabulary. Let us address the study of mathematics in order to prove the Unity of Language as an unattainable goal. Perhaps the closest unifying language available to scientists today is mathematics; differential and integral calculations are essential to the physicist in justifying his theorems, calculus serves as the foundation of chaos theory, and differential geometry was employed by Einstein in developing the theory of general relativity. It would seem that mathematics as a language applies across all disciplines of science, and therefore acts as a scientific unifier. Yet even the glorified language of mathematics fails to establish unity in the sciences, as argued by Ian Hacking in his Disunity of Science. Hacking refers to the language of mathematics as “the motley of mathematics.” Instead of serving as a scientific unifying agent, mathematics proves to be a mere collection (i.e. motley) of unified theories that fade in and out of relevancy. There are many mathematical theorems that have been accepted as unifying agents; the sheer number of these theories is a testament to a scientific pluralism that deems the goals of O&P’s Unity of Science unattainable. Moreover, while O&P employ theories of evolution and economics to justify their theory of micro-reduction, they fail to provide us with evidence that a unified scientific language is possible. Their Unity of Science as a working hypothesis is thus weakened, as they fail to address it in the first sense of their own definition—as the unity of vocabulary.

Yet not only does Unity of Science fail on the theoretical level; there are also logical counter-arguments to the hypothesis. O&P assume that elementary particles provide a scientific explanation upon which all else depends. They cite Bohr’s basic model of the atom as evidence of the aforementioned and argue that in its present mathematical form, Bohr’s atomic theory is “formidable indeed” because it is today “part of everyone’s conceptual apparatus” (278). Yet physicists today are only beginning to scratch the surface of atomic theory—they argue that there may be more to the elementary particle than meets the “eye.” The elementary particles may reduce to up-quarks and down-quarks, and those quarks may reduce to 11-dimensional strings. Thus, it is evident that our study of science is limited to the laws binding our perception. Therefore, I must reject the Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis and embrace a disunity founded upon scientific pluralism.

Works Cited

Hacking, Ian. “The Disunities of the Sciences.” The Disunity of Science. Eds. Galison and Stump. California: Stanford University Press, 1996.

Oppenheim, Paul, and Hilary Putnam. “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II (1958): 3-36.

“Scientific Pluralism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. 19 March 2009. .

On Scientific Realism: Bas Van Fraasen

In "Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism," author Bas Van Fraasen argues that the purpose of science is to provide us with theories that are empirically adequate. He posits this idea of scientific empiricism, rather than positing scientific realism, a concept referring to the idea that science can provide us with a real and accurate account of the world. Below is my paper in critique of such an interpretation of the role of science...

Bas Van Fraassen • Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

Identifying the Metaphysical Nature of Constructive Empiricism & Other Inconsistencies

For centuries, philosophers have claimed that there is no realistic means for humans to directly perceive the physical objects of our world. Pierre Le Morvan, in his “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How To Counter Them,” addresses one of the many anti-realist contentions—that direct realism is false, and that through an explanation of a sort of “long and complex causal series, physical objects or events cannot be immediate or direct objects of perception” (2). Similarly, in his Laws and Symmetry, philosopher Bas Van Fraassen posits an argument explaining physical phenomena (the use of the term phenomena here is telling) without presuming that those phenomena are borne from rules and/or laws which govern their behavior. What, then, is the role of science? If we can neither directly perceive physical objects nor apply rules and/or laws to physical phenomena, how does the scientist justify his efforts to do just that?

In “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism,” Van Fraassen offers the student of philosophy his answer: constructive empiricism. According to Van Fraassen and his constructive empiricist theory, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is empirically adequate” (358). He further explains that a theory is empirically adequate if and only if it “saves the phenomena” (358). It is this concept of “saving the phenomena” that is the focus of this essay. I contend that in offering this alternative to scientific realism, Van Fraassen falls prey to the very metaphysical trap he seeks to avoid. More broadly, his essay fails to address important tensions that manifest themselves through argumentation.

Van Fraassen succeeds at providing the student of philosophy with an easy-enough definition of what he means by empirically-adequate: “A theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in this world is true—exactly if it saves the phenomena.” Furthermore, he goes on to more precisely define an empirically adequate theory as one that has “at least one model that all the actual phenomena fit inside” (358). Inherent in this precise definition is Van Fraassen’s desire to draw the distinction between science as constructive empiricism and science from a realist perspective—a science he determines “aims to give us a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves only the belief that it is true” (357). Van Fraassen’s reader is ultimately able to discern the difference between constructive empiricism and the more general anti-realist position—something the author is extremely skillful in doing.

Yet Van Fraassen conveniently fails to clearly define what he means by saving the phenomena—a definition we are forced to interpret on our own. According to Kant, phenomena can be defined as objects or events as they appear in our experience, as opposed to objects and events as they are in and of themselves. More specifically-relevant in the context of Van Fraassen’s article, the term phenomena can refer to some mind-dependent entity which exists between the human observer and the actual, real object that is only understood by the mind. Presupposing Van Fraassen’s theory, I am able to safely assume that there is some abstract and invisible thing between me and the lamp that sits on the desk upon which I am writing—a thing which allows me to merely perceive the physical characteristics of the lamp using the senses at my disposal; thus, I can only predict the smooth texture of the brass by feeling it and the white of the lampshade by looking at it. Van Fraassen’s definition of saving the phenomena is predicated on the idea that sense-data merely predict appearances, as opposed to genuinely ascertaining the objective essence of things. Only now can we properly understand the role of science in our world according to Van Fraassen; only now can we comprehend that science seeks to provide a model that explains (i.e. saves) the phenomena.

But this concept of saving the phenomena is quite metaphysical in nature, and therein lies the most damaging inconsistency within the concept of constructive empiricism. Metaphysicists investigate the nature of a reality that transcends the principles of any modern science. The concept of saving the phenomena does just that—it presupposes a transcendent entity that is scientifically inexplicable and empirically inadequate. Van Fraassen argues that the scientist can only assign validity to a theory if it is empirically adequate: “To accept a theory is for us to believe that it is empirically adequate—that what the theory says about what is observable by us is true” (362). Yet since empirical adequacy applies only to the observable world, the reader is forced to assume a notion that is inherently empirically inadequate, as these phenomena are unobservable. Thus, we are unable to accept his theory—we can not see the phenomena that are so essential to the premise!

Moreover, the good empiricist generally seeks to avoid the metaphysical world; he believes in the importance of observation and hypotheses, and values the notion that knowledge is derived from experience. Yet Van Fraassen presupposes a concept that oozes metaphysical substance—a substance that wholly contradicts the essence of scientific empiricism. How can a logical philosopher assign validity to Van Fraassen’s conclusion that constructive empiricism is an accurate definition of science if his empirical conclusion is arrived at by use of a metaphysical premise? The very term empiricism in the context of Van Fraassen’s new anti-realist position is counterintuitive.

Moreover, Van Fraassen seems to have trouble developing a coherent argument concerning the purpose of theory and its association with the concept of explanation. He addresses the contentions of John Smart, a proclaimed scientific realist and author of Between Science and Philosophy. Smart argues that cosmic coincidences (i.e. regularities in observable phenomena) must be explained by some deeper structure (364). In seeking to negate Smart’s contention that the lucky accident explanation simply falls short, Van Fraassen concludes that “there is nothing here to motivate the demand for explanation, only a restatement in persuasive terms” (364). That is to say, Van Fraassen posits that theories merely describe brute regularities that do not have a deeper underlying explanation. Such a grandiose conclusion seems a bit contradictory when the reader recalls the author’s discussion of scientific commitment. According to Van Fraassen:

Acceptance involves not only belief, but a certain commitment—a commitment to confront any future phenomena by means of the conceptual resources of the theory. [The acceptance] determines the terms in which we shall seek explanations (359).

Once again, Van Fraassen employs inconsistent argumentation in the development of his contentions. It would seem incompatible to argue that observable regularities do not require explanation while simultaneously positing that a theory (constructive empiricism) involves a commitment to confront future phenomena in order to determine the terms in which one would seek explanation. What is it, then, that constructive empiricism seeks to achieve? Does not Van Fraassen seek to find that one model that all phenomena fit inside? Would not that provide us with an explanation? These questions go unanswered.

Van Fraassen’s definition of science through constructive empiricism is just as valid as any other theory we have for the explanation of scientific thought, despite being rife with glaring contradictions and troublesome inconsistencies. Yet can any anti-realist be faulted for failing to effectively negate scientific realism? In a discussion of this kind, can we really fault any anti-realist for failing to avoid a metaphysical premise? As Pierre Le Morvan’s “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them” shows us, eight highly-touted arguments against realism can and have failed to defeat it. The justification for this regularity is evident in a major tenet of scientific realism: that the entities described by theory exist independent of the mind. This implies a commitment to metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The scientific realists have it easy.

Works Cited

Fraassen, Bas V. “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism.” The Scientific Image: 355-68.

Le Morvan, Pierre. “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them.” American Philosophical Quarterly 41.3: 221-34.

“Scientific Realism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. 12 Feb. 2009 .